Abstract This article is a …rst look at the pro…t and welfare e¤ects of behavior-based price discrimination in a two-period multi-dimensional preferences model. Compared to one-dimensional models, we show that …rms compete less aggressively in both periods and so new results are obtained. Speci…cally, under forward looking consumers and two symmetric dimensions, BBPD boosts industry pro…ts at the expense of consumers. However, we show that the standard onedimensional welfare results can prevail under asymmetric dimensions and myopic consumers.
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Introduction
In many markets with repeat purchases …rms usually face customers with multi-dimensional preferences (e.g. for product taste, brands, store's location, and so on). When price discrimination is permitted and trade among consumers is not feasible, it is common for a …rm to o¤er di¤erent prices to its repeat customers and to those who bought from a rival before. This form of price discrimination, termed Behavior-Based Price Discrimination (henceforth BBPD), sometimes also 1 called price discrimination based on purchase history or dynamic pricing, is widely observed in many markets. In the communications markets, for instance, …rms frequently o¤er a lower price to a customer who has been using a competitor's service. Similar pricing strategies are employed in markets such as supermarkets, web retailers, credit cards, banking services and electricity and gas. 1 Although this type of competitive price discrimination has received wide attention in the economics literature in recent years, 2 the literature has hitherto focused on the assumption that consumer preferences are one-dimensional. Interestingly, in some markets where …rms often discriminate between their own and the rivals'consumers, consumer preferences might be better represented by a multi-dimensional framework.
To motivate our model suppose that consumer preferences for two companies, say McDonald's (Mc) and Burger King (BK) are modeled taking into account two dimensions: the brand preference dimension and the store's physical location dimension. This suggests that a speci…c consumer might have a strong preference for Mc in the brand dimension while he might have a strong preference for BK in the physical location dimension. Considering our motivating example, suppose that Mc and BK are running a mobile price advertising campaign. Both are able to distinguish a repeated customer from a new one and they have access to tools that allow them to send mobile ads with di¤erent o¤ers (prices) to old and new customers. Companies have, however, no information about individuals'true brand preference/location. A potential customer who is recognized as a repeated customer by BK can receive a targeted o¤er by BK. That same consumer may also be tracked by Mc which will recognize him/her as a new one and send a special o¤er. If the last o¤er is compelling enough, Mc can entice the consumer to travel to its store. While in the standard one-dimensional analysis a consumer who bough from BK in period 1 is necessarily closer to BK in that dimension, in a two-dimensional setting a consumer who bough from BK in period 1 might be closer to BK in one dimension but closer to Mc in the other one. Therefore, in this new setting some important issues are the following. What changes in terms of the companies'pricing strategies when we move from a one to a multi-dimensional framework? Do …rms compete more or less aggressively in prices? In what circumstances is BBPD a pro…table strategy for companies? Do consumers bene…t from BBPD?
Our base model follows Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) by considering a two-period duopoly with a multi-dimensional horizontal product di¤erentiation, where …rms cannot commit to future prices, and can quote a di¤erent price to old/new customers. This paper o¤ers important insights to the 1 A recent report by the O¢ ce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem (2008) ), the regulator for Britain's gas and electricity industries, has revealed that, in this industry: (i) a substantial fraction of consumers are 'switchers' in the sense that they constantly seek out for the best deal in the market; and (ii) suppliers are well aware of these consumers'dynamics and do take them into account in their pricing decisions. In particular, "companies charge more to existing ("sticky") customers whilst maintaining competitiveness in more price sensitive segments of the market. Available for download at: http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/ensuppro/Pages/Energysupplyprobe.aspx 2 Chen (2005) , Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) and Esteves (2009) present updated literature surveys on BBPD.
understanding of the …rms'pricing decisions to their strong and weak market segments in markets with multi-dimensional preferences. An important contribution is to show that competitive price discrimination based on purchase history needs not necessarily lead to the prisoners'dilemma result that generally follows in one-dimensional markets that exhibit best-response asymmetry. In fact, our analysis reveals that the practice of BBPD in a symmetric two-dimensional model hurts second period pro…t but boosts …rst period pro…t as well as overall pro…ts. Further, in contrast to the general presumption in one-dimensional models that BBPD is not bad for consumers, we show that in a symmetric two-dimensional setting do in fact BBPD raise industry pro…ts at the expense of consumers. Further, another important contribution is to clearly describe what market features are needed for BBPD to boost industry pro…ts at the expense of consumers. The extension of the model to 2 asymmetric dimensions reveals that su¢ cient symmetry is a key determinant for our results.
Literature review This paper is mainly related to two strands of the literature, namely the literature on competition in multi-dimensional product di¤erentiation markets and the literature on competitive price discrimination, mainly the literature on behavior-based price discrimination.
In a seminal paper, Irmen and Thisse (1998) analyze duopoly location choice in a general n-dimensional model. With the assumption of strong dominance, they show that …rms want to maximize di¤erentiation on the dominant dimension but minimize di¤erentiation on all other dimensions. Liu and Shuai (2013) employs a similar model of 2-group price discrimination. Their model is one-period, and …rms price discriminate based on exogenous information about consumers. In contrast, we consider a two-period model here where consumer information is generated endogenously through …rst-period consumer choices. Nevertheless, our results are similar in spirit in the sense that price discrimination (whether based on exogenous or endogenous information) can bene…t …rms at the cost of consumers, once we allow product di¤erentiation to occur on more than one dimension. This paper has also important connections with the literature on BBPD in one-dimensional competitive markets. Two approaches have been considered so far. In the switching costs approach, consumers initially view the two …rms as perfect substitutes; but in the second period they face a switching cost if they change supplier. In this setting, purchase history discloses information about exogenous switching costs (e.g. Chen, 1997 and Taylor, 2003) . Di¤erently, in the brand preferences approach with …xed preferences across periods (e.g. Villas-Boas, 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010) , purchase history discloses information about a consumer's exogenous brand preference for a …rm. Although the framework of competition di¤ers in both approaches their predictions have some common features. In these models the market exhibits best-response asymmetry (Corts, 1998) : the strong market segment of one …rm is the weak market segment of the competitor. A common …nding in such models is that …rms charge lower prices to customers in weak market segments (new/rival's customers) than to customers in strong segments (old customers) and, in comparison to uniform pricing, equilibrium pro…ts fall with price discrimination-…rms …nd themselves in the classic prisoner's dilemma. 3 Nonetheless, important di¤erences arise in both approaches when taking into account the e¤ects of poaching on initial prices. While in the brand preference approach initial prices are high and then decrease (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) , in the switching costs approach the reverse happens (e.g. Chen, 1997) .
This article contributes to the literature on price discrimination based on purchase history by investigating the pro…t and welfare e¤ects of BBPD in a two-dimensional consumer preferences model. By doing so, we show that BBPD can boost industry pro…ts at the expense of consumers. Chen and Pearcy (2010) have also shown that pro…ts can increase with BBPD in a one dimensional consumer preferences model. However, this is only the case when consumer preferences are weakly correlated across time. Although our framework is di¤erent from Chen and Pearcy (2010) (preferences are two-dimensional and …xed across periods), both papers seem to highlight that the practice of BBPD in the context of a certain level of uncertainty about consumer preferences softens price competition and allows …rms to use BBPD as a pro…table pricing strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the 2-dimensional base model with symmetric dimensions. Then Section 4 discusses the welfare e¤ects of BBPD and Section 5 discusses the robustness of our results to few extensions. We conclude in Section 6. Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
The model
Two …rms A and B produce at zero marginal cost nondurable goods A and B. 4 There are two periods, 1 and 2. The total number of consumers in the market is normalized to one. In each period, each consumer wishes to buy a single unit of the good from either …rm A or B, and he/she is willing to pay at most V: The reservation value V is su¢ ciently large so all consumers buy in the equilibrium (covered market). Consumers have exogenous preferences for goods that are present from the start and remain …xed over the two periods of consumption. 5 Speci…cally, consumer preferences are speci…ed in a 2-dimensional Hotelling model or on the unit square [0; 1] 2 ; with …rm A located at (0; 0) and …rm B located at (1; 1). Consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensions and distribution on the two dimensions is independent from each other. The location of a consumer on the square, i.e. (x; y) 2 [0; 1] 2 , represents his/her two-dimensional preference for 3 More recently, also in a one-dimensional approach, Chen and Pearcy (2010) and Shin and Sudhir (2010) have shown that pro…ts can increase with price discrimination, basically when consumer preferences are weakly correlated across time as well as in the case of high enough consumer heterogeneity. 4 The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature of the results derived throughout the model. 5 For a one-dimensional model of BBPD with imperfect correlated preferences across periods see Chen and Pearcy (2010) .
goods (e.g. preferences for brand name/good; characteristic 1/characteristic 2 of the good; store location/good). Further, consumers incur a disutility from travelling to the location of each …rm (good), which is quadratic in the distance traveled. 6 For a consumer located at (x; y) buying one unit of the good from A at price p A , the indirect utility is written as
where t is the unit transport cost on either dimension. 7 Similarly, if the consumer buys from …rm B at price p B his/her indirect utility is written as
Thus, our assumptions are quite standard in the literature except that we consider a twodimensional rather than the common one-dimensional model.
Suppose …rms cannot commit to future prices. Consumers reveal information about their preferences by their …rst-period choice. Thus, in period 1 each …rm sets a uniform price because it has no information to price discriminate. Observing the prices, consumers make …rst-period purchasing decisions. Depending on the purchasing decisions in period 1, the whole market is divided into two markets: …rm A's turf (Market 1) and …rm B's turf (Market 2). Hence, in period 2, each …rm can distinguish consumers in the two markets and price discriminate accordingly: each …rm will choose a price to its own past customers and another one to those consumers who purchased from the rival before. In each period, …rms choose their prices simultaneously. A strategy for …rm i; i = A; B, speci…es p 1i in period 1 and prices (p 2i1 ; p 2i2 ) in period 2 based on consumers'previous purchases, where p 2i1 and p 2i2 are, respectively, …rm i's prices for consumers in market 1 (those who bought from …rm A in period 1) and for consumers in market 2 (those who bought from …rm B in period 1). We look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Before proceeding, we …rst explain how consumers would make their purchasing decisions for any given prices.
The Marginal Consumers Line (MCL)
In particular, we derive the set of consumers who are indi¤erent between buying from either …rm. We show that they form a line and we call it the Marginal Consumers Line (MCL). Then consumers to the left (or bottom) of the MCL will purchase from …rm A while consumers to the right (or above) of the MCL will purchase from …rm B.
Look …rst at second-period price competition. Let p 2ij , i = A; B with j = 1; 2 denote second period prices o¤ered by …rms A and B to consumers in market j. A consumer is indi¤erent between the two …rms if and only if u 2A (x; y) = u 2B (x; y), from which we obtain
In our setup, linear and quadratic transport cost lead to the same equilibrium prices and pro…ts. 7 We consider the case of asymmetric dimensions (t1 6 = t2) in the Extensions.
which yields
Look next at …rst-period competition. Let …rm A's …rst-period price be p 1A and …rm B's …rst-period price be p 1B . The marginal consumer in the …rst period will surely switch in the second period to take advantage of the poaching price. Given the …rst-period prices, the indi¤erent consumer between buying from …rm A in period 1 at price p A1 and then buying from B in period 2 at the poaching price p 2B1 , or buying from B in period 1 at price p 1B and then buying from A at the poaching price p 2A2 is located at the marginal consumers line MCL, characterized by
Uniform pricing in a two-dimensional model
The case where …rms cannot price discriminate, meaning that each …rm sets a uniform price to all consumers in each period, is used as a benchmark in the subsequent analysis. Suppose that for some reason (e.g. regulation, costs of changing prices, technological restrictions) …rms in the second period can not price discriminate. In that case, the two-period model reduces to two replications of the static equilibrium which has been analyzed in several existing studies (e.g. Liu and Shuai, 2013; Tabuchi, 1994) . Based on these models it is straightforward to prove that …rm i's equilibrium prices and pro…ts (marked with superscript u; for uniform pricing) in each period are:
(1)
and …rm i's overall pro…t is equal to
Equilibrium Analysis
As usual in order to …nd the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium we solve the game working backwards from the second period.
Second-period
In period 2, each …rm is able to distinguish its own customers from those who bought from the rival before, and charge di¤erent prices accordingly. Without loss of generality, assume that given the …rms'…rst-period prices, the …rst-period MCL crosses the bottom horizontal line at (x 1 ; 0) with x 1 2 (0; 1]. 8 The MCL thus splits the square into two markets: market 1 consists of those customers who bought from …rm A in period 1, while market 2 is made o¤ consumers who bought from …rm B in period 1. In the second period …rms compete in these two markets separately. We …rst establish the equilibrium demand structure in period 2, given the prices tailored to each market.
Lemma 1 In period 2, MCL must cross the bottom horizontal line in market 1 and cross the top horizontal line in market 2.
Proof. Let us start with market 1 which is itself a triangle. MCL cannot possibly cross top horizontal line in period 2.
What about market 2? Suppose that MCL crosses bottom horizontal line at (x 3 ; 0), with x 3 2 (x 1 ; 1]. Under this demand structure, we solve the equilibrium prices. We …nd that they lead to x 3 > 1, suggesting that MCL crosses the top horizontal line, violation.
Based on Lemma 1, we draw the demand structure as in Figure 1 . Suppose that MCL 21 crosses the bottom horizontal line in market 1 at (x 2 ; 0), and the MCL 22 crosses the top horizontal line at (x 3 ; 1) in market 2 (…rm B's old customers).
Let q 2ij (determined in the Appendix) represent …rm i = A; B's second-period demand in market j = 1; 2; then …rm i's second-period pro…t in market j equals:
In the second period, each …rm chooses the second-period prices in order to maximize expression (4). Overall second-period pro…t for …rm i is 2i = 2i1 + 2i2 :
Figure 1: Demand structures (MCLs) in period 1 and 2.
The next Lemma characterizes the second-period price equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the MCL crosses the bottom horizontal line at (x 1 ; 0) in period 1. Then second period equilibrium prices are:
x 1 1 :
Proof. See the Appendix. Figures 2 and 3 plot both …rms'prices targeted to market 1 and 2 as a function of x 1 , for the case where t = 1: (ii) decreases the price for …rm B's new consumers, regardless of x 1 .
(iii) decreases both …rms' prices targeted to market 2, regardless the value of x 1 :
Look …rst at prices targeted to market 2. The previous corollary suggests that compared to uniform pricing, as long as x 1 is not null, both …rms charge a lower price to customers in market 2. Speci…cally, we observe that p 2A2 < p 2B2 < p u : As x 1 increases the same happens to the di¤erence between p 2B2 and p 2A2 : This suggests that …rm A is more likely to poach some of …rm B's previous customers the higher is x 1 .
Look next at prices targeted to market 1. Corollary 1 suggests that the price o¤ered by …rm B to new customers is always below the uniform price, while the price o¤ered by …rm A to its old customers can be above/below its uniform counterpart. Note that the lower is x 1 the higher is …rm B's market share in period 1 (and so the size of market 2). Indeed, when x 1 is small enough, attracting new consumers is not pro…table for …rm B as it would require a below-marginal-cost price. This case is presented in point (i) of Lemma 2 where …rm B prefers the dominant strategy of setting a poached price equal to the marginal cost (i.e., p 2B1 = 0) in …rm A's turf (market 1). From the point of view of …rm A, the lower is x 1 the weaker the price competition in its own turf, as the rival becomes less aggressive. For this reason, when x 1 < 2 3 ; the equilibrium price o¤ered by …rm A to its old customers is decreasing in x 1 , and can be above the uniform price. This …nding is in contrast to what happens in the one-dimensional model, where the second period prices are all below the uniform price when BBPD is permitted. Taking into account the equilibrium prices targeted to market 1, we also …nd that if x 1 is not su¢ ciently high then …rm B (the dominating …rm in period 1) does not attract any consumer in market 1, even though it charges a price equal to the marginal cost. In contrast, when x 1 is su¢ ciently high (the …rst-period market share is balanced enough), and in this case …rm B is able to attract some consumers in market 1. Consequently, both …rms' prices targeted to market 1 are below the uniform price. Finally, it is important to stress that in the case where x 1 = 1; then both …rms share equally the market in period 1. In this case, as usual in the literature, we observe that p 2B1 < p 2A1 < p u ; and …rm B is able to poach some of …rm A's previous customers. Furthermore, when x 1 = 1; we have that p 2A1 = p 2B2 and p 2A2 = p 2B1 :
First-period
We now move on to period 1. We …rst show that there is no asymmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (i.e., with p 1A 6 = p 1B ).
Lemma 3 There is no asymmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium (with p 1A 6 = p 1B ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Having ruled out asymmetric equilibrium, we look for the symmetric SPNE and we …nd a unique one, characterized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 1 When …rms can engage in BBPD in a two-dimensional market, in the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium: (i) …rst-period prices are
(ii) second-period 2 prices are
(iii) second-period pro…ts are 
Competitive and welfare e¤ects
This section looks at the price, pro…t, consumer surplus and welfare e¤ects of BBPD in a twodimensional consumer preferences market. In order to provide this analysis, prices, pro…ts and consumer surplus resulting under BBPD in the two-dimensional model are compared with (i) the benchmark case of no BBPD, which serves to isolate the impact of price discrimination; and with (ii) BBPD in the one-dimensional model.
E¤ect on prices
Most of the existing academic literature on BBPD suggests that when the market exhibits best-response asymmetry one …rm's weak market is the other's strong market the optimal choice for each …rm is to o¤er a lower price to its low preference consumers than to its high preference consumers (e.g. Chen, 1997; Villas-Boas, 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010) . 9 In what follows we investigate this issue and also how BBPD a¤ects the …rms'…rst-period decisions.
Compared to the uniform benchmark case, the equilibrium price with BBPD is higher for all consumers in period 1 but lower for all consumers in period 2, the same as in the one dimensional model (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) . As purchase history reveals the consumers'brand preferences, each …rm has an incentive to reduce the price to customers who bought from the rival before as an attempt to entice them to switch. However, because both …rms set a lower price to customers in their weak markets, they induce the rival to be more aggressive in its strong market as well. Due to the intensi…ed competition e¤ect of price discrimination, all prices fall in period 2. Thus our analysis con…rms the usual …ndings in the literature, suggesting that in the two-dimensional model …rms also quote lower prices to their weak segment than to their strong segment of consumers.
However, it is important to stress that although second-period equilibrium prices fall with price discrimination in our set-up, the same as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , second-period prices in the two-dimensional model are above their one dimensional counterparts. According to Proposition 1, repeated consumers pay t
which is above the price they pay in the one-dimensional approach 9 An exception is Shin and Sudhir (2010) who show that …rms can charge a low price to their strong customers when consumer preferences stochasticity across time and consumer heterogeneity are simultaneously high enough.
(i.e., 2t 3 ). Similarly, in the two-dimensional model, the price for new customers is t 3 p 5 5 4 which is also above its counterpart of 1 3 t in the one-dimensional set-up. This suggests that the existence of a second-dimension acts to soften price competition in period 2, allowing …rms to raise second-period prices, compared to the one-dimensional model. The driving force behind this result is the following. In a one dimensional model all consumers in say …rm B's weak market have a preference for …rm A, suggesting that …rm B wants to price aggressively in this market. In contrast, in a two-dimensional model, not all consumers in a …rm's weak market have a preference for the rival's product in the two dimensions. Indeed, in a two-dimensional model, some consumers in, for instance, …rm B's weak market might have a preference for …rm A in one dimension while they might prefer …rm B in the other dimension. This suggests that compared to the one-dimensional model, …rm B has now fewer incentives to reduce the price to consumers who bought from …rm A in period 1. Because prices are strategic complements, when …rm B prices less aggressively in its weak market, …rm A reacts in the same way regarding the price tailored to its strong segment of the market. As a result of that, old and new customers face higher prices in the two-dimensional model.
As to the e¤ect of BBPD on the …rst-period price, we …nd that it is equal to t 1 + 13 p 5 25 10 in the two-dimensional model, while it is equal to t(1 + =3) in the one-dimensional set-up. Therefore, it is straightforward to see that as long as > 0; each …rm charges a higher …rst-period equilibrium price when consumer preferences are two-dimensional. This highlights that BBPD has a stronger positive e¤ect on the …rst-period price in our set-up than in the one-dimensional counterpart.
Before proceeding we discuss with more detail the main di¤erences and intuitions behind the impact of BBPD on …rst-period prices in the one and two dimensional models. Consider …rst the one-dimensional model (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) . Here, the reason why the …rst period price is above the uniform one is entirely explained by the decreased elasticity of demand. The intuition is the following. When consumers are sophisticated they anticipate the lower second period price and thus they become less price sensitive in period 1. This softens price competition in period 1, allowing …rms to raise the …rst period equilibrium price. In contrast, when consumers are myopic, BBPD has no e¤ect on the …rst period price equilibrium. Thus, in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , compared to uniform pricing, …rms do not distort their …rst-period price equilibrium when consumers are naive.
Consider next our two-dimensional framework. Here the decreased elasticity of demand can also explain in part why the …rst-period price is above its non-discrimination counterpart. This is specially the case when consumers are forward-looking. The reason is that, in contrast to what happens in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , here we still …nd that …rms price above the non-discrimination price in period 1 even when consumers are assumed to be naive (see the discussion in Section 5.2). Therefore, our analysis suggests that in the two-dimensional model apart from the decreased elasticity of demand there should be another driving force behind the higher …rst-period prices.
In general it can be said that when …rms can engage in price discrimination based on purchase history there are two e¤ects on …rst-period prices: a consumer-side e¤ect and a …rm-side e¤ect. When consumers are forward-looking they correctly anticipate lower second period prices, become less price sensitive in period 1 and so there is a positive e¤ect on …rst-period prices. When …rms are forward looking, they also take into account that changes in the …rst-period price change the …rst-period cuto¤ and thus change the nature of the second-period competition. In the one dimensional model of BBPD a change in the …rst-period price has no e¤ect on second-period pro…t because with a uniform distribution a …rm's marginal gains in one second-period market are exactly o¤set by losses in the other ( (2000) the decrease in the price sensitivity of consumers in period 1 that occurs when we move from no discrimination to BBPD fully determines the result of …rst-period prices above the non-discrimination level.
In the two-dimensional model we …nd that, with the uniform distribution, a change in the …rst-period price does not cancel out in the neighborhood of x 1 = 1, speci…cally we …nd that
> 0, suggesting that …rm A's marginal gains in one second-period market (higher price p 2A2 targeted to market 2) are higher than losses in the other (lower price p 2A1 targeted market 1). Put di¤erently, the reason why BBPD raises …rst period prices in the two dimensional model is because the MCL in the second period crosses one horizontal line and one vertical line. In this case the length of the MCL depends on prices. If say …rm A is aggressive in the …rst period, its strong market is larger in the second period, in equilibrium, the length of the MCL is likely to be larger, and more marginal consumers means that …rm B would have more incentive to charge a lower price. Thus aggressive pricing in the …rst period will induce its competitor not only be aggressive in the …rst period, but also in the second period. In contrast when …rm A charges a higher …rst period price, its strong market is smaller in the second period, in equilibrium, the length of the MCL is likely to be smaller, and less marginal consumers means that …rm B would have less incentive to charge a lower price. Thus an increase in the …rst period price will induce its competitor not only to play less aggressively in the …rst period, but also in the second period. Consequently, each …rm's …rst period price with BBPD is thus higher than its uniform counterpart. This is also true when consumers are myopic ( = 0), suggesting that in our framework BBPD leads to higher …rst-period prices even when consumers are myopic.
Summing up, compared to the one-dimensional framework our analysis highlights that price discrimination leads …rms to compete less aggressively in both periods, suggesting that di¤erent pro…t e¤ects can arise in the bi-dimensional consumer preferences set-up.
E¤ect on pro…ts
An important question for academics, managers and practitioners is whether price discrimination by purchase history is a pro…table strategy for …rms in comparison to uniform pricing. In most the economic environments that have been used in the literature, oligopoly price discrimination based on customers past behavior tends to lower industry pro…ts. This is generally the case in oligopoly markets characterized by best-response asymmetry and one-dimensional consumer preferences which are stable across time (e.g. Chen, 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Esteves, 2010 ; to name few). Our aim in this section is to investigate whether this common …nding in the literature remains when we allow consumer preferences to be bi-dimensional and stable across time.
Compared to the non-discrimination benchmark, we …nd that price discrimination raises the equilibrium pro…t in period 1 whereas it reduces the equilibrium pro…t in period 2. The next corollary summarizes the pro…t e¤ects of BBPD in our model. Corollary 2. In a two-dimensional consumer preferences model, Behavior-Based Price Discrimination hurts second period pro…t but boosts …rst period pro…t and overall pro…ts.
An important contribution of this paper is to show that price discrimination by purchase history is a pro…table strategy for …rms when consumer preferences are two-dimensional. Indeed, Corollary 2 highlights that the positive e¤ect of price discrimination on …rst-period pro…t dominates the negative e¤ect on second-period pro…t, thus the ability of …rms to engage in price discrimination based on purchase history actually raises the overall discounted equilibrium pro…t in a two-dimensional model. Note that BBP D > U ; so BBPD actually raises overall pro…ts relative to the uniform pricing. Consequently, this …nding is in sharp contrast to the overall pro…t e¤ect of BBPD in one-dimensional models, in which …rms …nd themselves in the classic prisoner's dilemma when they employ BBPD. Obviously, the economic intuition behind our result is based on the previous explanation about the e¤ect of BBPD on …rst and second period prices.
Compared to BBPD in one-dimensional models, we can show that the positive impact of BBPD on …rst period pro…t is stronger in a two-dimensional than in a one-dimensional model, thus:
Additionally, straightforward computations show also that moving from a one-dimensional analysis to a two-dimensional one, reduces the negative impact of BBPD on second period pro…ts. This yields
Summing up, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the pro…t implications of this form of dynamic price discrimination, only made possible in the context of digital markets. Like Chen and Pearcy (2010) and Shin and Sudhir (2010) we …nd that BBPD can actually raise equilibrium pro…ts. However, in their one-dimensional consumer preferences models this is only the case when the consumers'preference dependence across time is low. In fact, when preferences are …xed across time, industry pro…ts fall under BBPD.
E¤ect on consumer surplus and overall welfare
In this section we discuss the main policy implications for competition policy agencies and/or consumer advocates that can be derived from our theoretical model. Policy options against price discrimination by purchase history should be based on the whether price discrimination is likely to be bene…cial to consumers or not. A general presumption in the literature on BBPD in onedimensional models with …xed preferences across time is that "price discrimination by purchase history ... is by and large unlikely to raise signi…cant antitrust concerns. In fact, as the economics literature suggests, such pricing practices in oligopoly markets often intensify competition and potentially bene…t consumers." (Chen, 2005, p. 123) . Our goal in this section is to investigate what changes in terms of the consumer welfare e¤ects when BBPD is employed in the context of a bi-dimensional model. Interestingly, Corollary 3 shows that price discrimination based on consumers'past behavior will increase industry pro…ts at the expense of consumers'surplus and overall welfare. It is important to stress that consumers in the middle, close to the main diagonal will be better o¤ under BBPD. Those far away will be worse o¤. However, in aggregate terms they enjoy a lower surplus with BBPD than under uniform pricing. Therefore, our analysis highlights that the welfare e¤ects of BBPD in a one dimensional setting higher consumer surplus at the expense of industry pro…ts and welfare do not prevail when we allow preferences to be two-dimensional.
Corollary 3. In a two-dimensional model, compared to uniform pricing, Behavior-Based Price Discrimination harms consumer surplus and overall welfare.
The proof of Corollary 3 is straightforward. Regarding overall welfare note that total transport cost is minimized under uniform pricing. Therefore, social surplus must be lower under BBPD. Combined with higher pro…ts under BBPD, it follows that in aggregate consumer surplus must be lower under BBPD than under uniform pricing.
In order to summarize the main literature …ndings and inform competition policy agencies, Table  1 shows the comparative static results obtained in a model of one-dimensional …xed preferences across time (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) ; in a model of one-dimensional correlated preferences across time (Chen and Pearcy, 2010 ) and in a model of two-dimensional …xed preferences across time. Regarding the aggregate e¤ects of BBPD on welfare, because there is no role for price discrimination to increase aggregate output, variations in welfare are uniquely explained by the "disutility" supported by those consumers who buy ine¢ ciently. 10 As a result of that, in comparison to no discrimination, BBPD hurts overall welfare in the three models considered. Table 1 also shows that in fact the pro…t and consumer welfare e¤ects obtained in a one-dimensional model with …xed preferences are the reverse of their counterparts in the two-dimensional model of consumer preferences. Di¤erent conclusions are obtained when we compare our results with those obtained by Chen and Pearcy (2010) . As expected they con…rm the welfare e¤ects in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) when consumer preferences'dependence across the two periods is high. In contrast, when consumer preferences'dependence is low (or independent), like in our setting, they …nd that BBPD boosts industry pro…ts at the expense of consumer welfare. In spite of the di¤erent assumptions considered in their model and in ours, the intuition behind the same pro…t and consumer welfare e¤ect is based on what …rms learn about consumer preferences. The existence of some level of uncertainty about consumer preferences either due to the two-dimensional assumption or to unstable preferences across time acts to soften price competition between …rms which in turn enhances industry pro…ts at the expense of consumers.
Summing up, taking into account our …ndings and those in the economics literature, we can say that conclusions regarding the pro…t and welfare e¤ects of price discrimination based purchase history do depend on the way consumer preferences are modelled and on what is learned about consumers. Our results, thus, carry an important policy implications regarding the practice of price discrimination by purchase history. When the welfare standard adopted by competition authorities to appraise price discrimination based on purchase history is the consumers'welfare, 11 our model 1 0 For a model where BBPD can a¤ect aggregate output see Esteves and Reggiani (2014) . 1 1 It should be noted, however, that the adoption of the consumers' welfare standard appears to be the current practice in the major antitrust jurisdictions. As Lyons (2002, p. 1) highlights, "most major competition authorities operate under legislation and guidelines that reject this [total surplus] standard, and no major competition authority seems to apply it consistently.
suggests that they should scrutinize these pricing strategies with greater zeal in markets that could be reasonably well represented by the two-dimensional distribution assumption.
Extensions
In this section we discuss the main implications in terms of the pro…t and consumer welfare e¤ects of BBPD 12 when the base model is extended to (i) asymmetric dimensions and (ii) myopic consumers.
Asymmetric dimensions (t
The previous analysis focused attention on a symmetric two-dimensional model where t 1 = t 2 = t: So, it is natural to wonder what would be the implications for the proposed game if one allows for two asymmetric dimensions. Without loss of generality, assume that t 1 t 2 . We only look for the symmetric equilibrium. Taking into account this possibility we …nd that when t 1 t 2 , the slope of MCL is not necessarily 1, but instead
. The MCL line will cross both top and horizontal lines in period 1. In period 2, if t 2 is not too small relative to t 1 (i.e., Remember that in our base model with 1 2 Remember that because consumers buy e¢ ciently under uniform pricing, the permission of BBPD will always have a negative impact on social welfare. ; 0:8695) and
, BBPD bene…ts consumers at the cost …rms. However, pro…ts depend on t2 in the former case but not the latter case (due to the irrelevance of the second dimension).
Myopic consumers
So far we have assumed that consumers are forward-looking in the sense that they anticipate that next period prices may depend on their behavior in period 1. Relaxing this assumption in our framework would imply assuming that in period 1 consumers are myopic, which means that they do not anticipate any poaching attempt by …rms in the future. The second period equilibrium is obviously the same as in the base model. However, in period 1, each consumer makes his/her purchasing decision solely based on the …rst-period utility of buying from either …rm. The marginal indi¤erent consumer is characterized by
With myopic consumers, we can directly solve for the marginal consumer located at (x 1 ; 0); which yields
Solving both …rms' …rst period FOCs, it is straightforward to obtain the equilibrium prices and pro…ts. 16 In the two-dimensional model with myopic consumers, we …nd that the practice of BBPD softens price competition in the …rst-period, and so …rst-period prices are above their non-discrimination counterparts. This is in contrast to the result obtained under a one-dimensional model (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) where BBPD has no impact on …rst period price when consumers are naive. The extension of the base model to myopic consumers shows that forward looking …rms do in fact distort their …rst period price behavior even when consumers are myopic. Therefore, it shows that the practice of BBPD in a two-dimensional setting leads …rms to raise …rst-period prices above the uniform level whether consumers are forward looking or not.
As explained, in general when …rms can engage in price discrimination based on purchase history there are two e¤ects on …rst-period prices: a consumer-side e¤ect and a …rm-side e¤ect. When consumers are forward-looking they correctly anticipate lower second period prices, become less price sensitive in period 1 and so there is a positive e¤ect on …rst-period prices. When …rms are forward looking, they also take into account that changes in the …rst-period price change the …rst-period cuto¤ and thus changes the nature of the second-period competition. However, in the one dimensional model of BBPD a change in the …rst-period price has no e¤ect on second-period pro…t because with a uniform distribution a …rm's marginal gains in one second-period market are exactly o¤set by losses in the other ( @ 2 @p 1 = 0): Thus, in this case the decrease in the price sensitivity of consumers in period 1 that occurs when we move from no discrimination to BBPD fully determines the result of …rst-period prices above the non-discrimination level.
In the two-dimensional model with a uniform distribution we …nd that a change in the …rst-period price does not cancel out in the neighborhood of x 1 = 1, speci…cally we …nd that suggesting that …rm A's marginal gains in one second-period market (higher price p 2A2 targeted to market 2) are higher than losses in the other (lower price p 2A1 targeted market 1). Thus, …rms price above the uniform …rst-period prices even when consumers are myopic. However as expected …rms set higher …rst-period prices under BBPD with forward-looking consumers.
Regarding the …rms' pro…ts with myopic consumers, we …nd that period 2 pro…ts are higher than their counterparts in a one-dimensional model but below the non-discrimination pro…t:
Further, the …rst-period pro…t with BBPD satis…es:
It is important to stress that in contrast to what happens under forward looking consumers, the assumption of consumers'naivety is bad for overall pro…ts. Indeed, we …nd that under myopic consumers, although BBPD raises …rst-period pro…ts, the overall impact on pro…ts is negative. The reason is that the increase in pro…ts in period 1 (due to higher …rst-period prices even when consumers are naive) is not enough to overcome the decrease in pro…ts in period 2 (due to price discrimination). The economic intuition is the following. The consideration of second period utility in …rst period purchasing decisions makes consumers less sensitive to price cuts in period 1, allowing …rms to further raise prices. This softens price competition in period 1 and raises prices and pro…ts to a level that overcomes the pro…t loss in period 2. Consequently, when consumers are naive the increase in pro…ts in period 1 is not su¢ ciently high to overcome the decrease in pro…ts in period 2, suggesting that BBPD is bad for overall industry pro…ts in a two-dimensional model with myopic consumers.
In sum, it is important to stress that the assumption of forward looking versus naive consumers plays a role on the pro…t e¤ects of BBPD in a two-dimensional symmetric model. When consumers are forward looking the model highlights that BBPD boosts industry pro…ts at the expense of consumer welfare; the reverse happens when consumers are naive.
Conclusion
The economics literature on oligopoly price discrimination by purchase history has focused uniquely on markets with one-dimensional consumer preferences. When these preferences are …xed across time, dynamic price discrimination by competing …rms often results in intensi…ed competition; and such pricing practices typically reduce pro…ts and do not raise consumer welfare concerns.
This article has taken a …rst step in developing a theory of BBPD in a two-dimensional consumer preferences model. In this new framework, the paper addresses the following questions. How does price discrimination by purchase history a¤ect competition and consumers? Should public policies facilitate or prevent the practice of such price discrimination?
In so doing the paper provides useful implications for managers, employing price discrimination strategies; and for policy competition agencies, evaluating the e¤ects of price discrimination based on consumers'purchase history. A standard dilemma for managers engaging in price discrimination based on purchase history, in competitive markets where consumer-preferences are one-dimensional and …xed across time, is that pro…ts fall at the expense of consumer welfare gains. Our analysis reveals that managers might not necessarily face this dilemma when consumer preferences are bi-dimensional. Indeed, the paper highlights that behavior-based price discrimination can be a pro…table pricing strategy in markets where consumers are sophisticated and their preferences reasonably well represented by a two symmetric dimensional distribution. For competition policy agencies the paper highlights that conclusions regarding the pro…t and consumer welfare e¤ects of price discrimination based purchase history do depend on the way consumer preferences are modelled and on what is learned about consumer demand. While BBPD can potentially not raise consumer welfare concerns in one-dimensional models with …xed preferences across time, the reverse might happen when consumer preferences are rather two-dimensional.
In light of the above, this paper has tried to contribute to the ongoing debate on the economic implications of price discrimination based on consumers'past behavior, only made possible in the context of digital markets. The main results of the paper and those in the received literature suggest that the speci…city of each market plays an important role in the conclusions derived. Notwithstanding the model addressed in this paper is far from covering all complex aspects of real markets (some of which perhaps not yet known), it provides a theoretical rationale for the increasingly use of new forms of price discrimination strategies only possible in the context of digital markets. As the theoretical model provides empirically testable hypotheses, we hope it can be used for further empirical research. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider a marginal consumer in period 1. If she purchases from A, she will be poached by …rm B in period 2, and enjoy an overall utility of
In contrast, if she purchases from …rm B in period 1, she will be poached by …rm A in period 2 and enjoy an overall utility of
MCL is characterized by u A = u B . We consider the speci…c marginal consumer (x 1 ; 0) where MCL crosses the bottom horizontal line. Substituting (x; y) = (x 1 ; 0), we can obtain u A = u B ) (p 1B p 1A ) + 2t(1 x 1 )(1 ) + 3 t 4 q 9 4x 2 1 q 4x 2 1 + 1 = 0:
Closed form solution for x 1 cannot be obtained. Instead, we use implicit function theorem, we can obtain dx 1 dp 1A = dx 1 dp 1B = and their overall discounted pro…t is i = 1i + 2i ; i = A; B:
A change in p 1A a¤ects A through 3 channels: (i) directly through p 1A on 1A ; (ii) indirectly through x 1 on 1A ; (iii) indirectly through x 1 on 2A (needs discounting). Similarly for …rm B.
FOCs are given by
dx 1 dp 1A + @ 2A @x 1 dx 1 dp 1A = 0;
dx 1 dp 1B + @ 2B @x 1 dx 1 dp 1B = 0:
Next, we solve @ B @p 1B = 0 to obtain p 1B . The expression is too lengthy to report, but it contains x 1 which depends on p 1B . We also use equation 8 to solve for p 1A . After normalizing t = 1,
is a function of and x 1 only. We then plot the value of At x 1 = 1, we have p 1A = p 1B so there exists no asymmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1
In Lemma 3, we have shown that there is no asymmetric equilibrium. In particular, both …rms FOCs are satis…ed only when x 1 = 1 in which case we have p 1A = p 1B = 13 p 5 25 10 t + t
We then substitute them to obtain the second period prices This is the only equilibrium candidate. Next, we verify that no …rm has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. For either …rm, there are only two deviations: reduces or raises …rst-period price.
We …rst rule out …rm's incentive to raise …rst period price. Fix p 1B and assume that …rm A increases p 1A . This leads to x 1 < 1 so our assumed demand structure still holds. In Proof of Lemma 3, we have shown that @ A @p 1A < 0 if x 1 < 1. Therefore, …rm A has no incentive to raise p 1A .
Next, we rule out incentives to reduce …rst period price. Fix p 1A and assume that …rm B lowers p 1B . This leads to x 1 < 1 so our assumed demand structure still holds. Following similar analysis as above, we …nd that @ B @p 1B > 0 if x 1 < 1. Therefore, …rm B has no incentive to lower p 1B .
Combined, neither …rm has an incentive to raise or lower …rst period prices. Therefore, the …rst period prices we calculated, together with the corresponding second period prices, form the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Using the price expressions, we can also obtain the equilibrium pro…ts in period 2 and overall pro…ts.
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